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SECTIONS 46 (1) AND (1AA) OF THE TRADE 
PRACTICES ACT: THE STRUGGLE OF THE SMALL 
AGAINST THE LARGE 
STEPHEN CORONES* 
The purpose of this article is to highlight the conflict in the policy objectives of 
subs 46(1) and subs 46(1AA) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). 
The policy objective of subs 46(1) is to promote competition and efficient 
markets for the benefit of consumers (consumer welfare standard). It does not 
prohibit corporations with substantial market power using cost savings arising 
from efficiencies such economies of scale or scope, to undercut small 
business competitors The policy objective of 46(1AA), on the other hand, is to 
protect small business operators from price discounting by their larger 
competitors.. Unlike subs 46(1), it does not contain a ‘taking advantage’ 
element. It is argued that subs 46(1AA) may harm consumer welfare by 
having a chilling effect on price competition if this would harm small business 
competitors.  
INTRODUCTION 
Measures such as s46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) raise 
issues that are intensely political. Whether they should be used for social and 
political objectives, such as the protection of small business, or for purely 
economic objectives, such as safeguarding an effective competitive process 
for the benefit of consumers, is a matter of public policy. The emerging 
consensus in most jurisdictions is that the fundamental objective of 
competition law should be safeguarding an effective competitive process 
relying on economic analysis; however, there is not complete unanimity on 
this issue.  
The Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth) was the 
culmination of a long political struggle between those representing the 
interests of small business and those representing the interests of big 
business. It can be traced back to 2004 with the hearings by the Senate 
Economics References Committee into whether s 46 adequately protects 
small businesses from anti-competitive conduct.  
The Senate Inquiry Report tabled on 1 March 20041 unanimously concluded 
that the TPA needed to be amended to protect small business from anti-
competitive conduct. The Committee made six recommendations in relation to 
s 46 to provide for small business protection. 
Prior to the last election, the Howard Government enacted the Trade 
Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2007 which created a new, 
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predatory pricing prohibition for the protection of small business, subs 
46(1AA). Subs 46(1AA) is referred to as the ‘Birdsville Amendment’ since it 
was championed by Queensland Nationals Senator, Barnaby Joyce, and sent 
to his political colleagues from the Birdsville Hotel. It was hastily drafted and 
passed without proper consultation or debate in a last minute attempt to win 
over small business groups. According to Senator Joyce’s Press Release 
dated 11 September 2007, it ‘redefines the assessment of unreasonable 
market power and ensures that abuses of such power are outlawed for the 
benefit of small business.’ 
This new provision prohibits ‘predatory pricing’, defined as pricing below 
‘relevant’ cost for a ‘sustained period’. It substantially changed competition 
law in two important respects. First, it applies to corporations with a 
substantial market share rather than substantial market power. Senator Joyce 
and small business groups argued that proving a corporation has substantial 
market share would be easier than proving substantial market power. 
Secondly, it does not contain a ‘taking advantage’ element, thereby removing 
another of the perceived hurdles faced by small business in challenging price 
discounting by large firms.  
Following the defeat of the Howard Government, the Rudd Government 
introduced the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 2008 on 26 June 
2008. In relation to subs 46(1AA), the Bill proposed to remove the test of 
market share as the jurisdictional threshold for proceedings under subs 
46(1AA) in favour of a market power test. Secondly, it proposed to re-insert a 
‘taking advantage’ element, thereby aligning it with subs 46(1).  
The Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 2008 was referred to the 
Senate Economics Committee for inquiry.  The Committee (with a majority of 
government members) offered qualified support for the Bill in its Report 2, over 
a strongly worded dissent from the Committee's opposition members.  The Bill 
passed the House of Representatives without amendment shortly afterwards.   
 
In the Senate, the Opposition moved amendments to the Bill to delete the 
proposed substantive alterations to subs 46(1AA).3  With the support of 
independent Senators Fielding and Xenophon, the Opposition's amendments 
were successful and the Bill was passed with the amendments.  Thus, subs 
46(1AA) remains unchanged. 
 
The central theme of this article is that we now have two provisions in Pt IV of 
the TPA with policy objectives that are at odds with each other. Subsection 
46(1) promotes the competitive process for the benefit of consumers, even if 
this harms small business competitors. The ‘taking advantage’ element in 
subs 46(1) plays a significant role in that it makes legal the use of efficiencies 
by firms with substantial market power.  
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3 See Hansard,(Senate) 15 September 2008, pp 4746-4769. 
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Sub-section 46(1AA), on the other hand, does not contain a ‘taking 
advantage’ element and could make it illegal for a firm with a substantial 
market share to use efficiencies to discount below the prices of its smaller 
competitors. 
There may be legitimate reasons for protecting small business operators from 
exploitative or unfair conduct; however, this should be the primary focus of 
other laws such as Pt IVA of the TPA. Small business protection is not an 
appropriate consideration in a competition law such as s 46. 
POLICY OBJECTIVES  
Section 46 must be read in the context of the policy object sought to be 
achieved. The wording of subs 46(1) is so open-ended that there is room for 
differing views about its policy objectives. 
During the Debates in the Senate on the Bill which became the 1974 Act, the 
Attorney-General, Senator Lionel Murphy, made clear that that the original 
intention of s46 was not to catch conduct such as price discounting that 
merely reflected the realisation of efficiencies: 
The provision is not directed at size as such. It is confined to conduct by 
which a monopolist uses the market power he derives from his size against 
the competitive position of competitors or would-be competitors…A 
monopolist is not prevented from competing as well as he is able, e.g. by 
taking advantage of economies of scale, developing new products or 
otherwise making full use of such skills as he has…In doing these things he is 
not taking advantage of market power.4 
Five years later, when the TPA was reviewed to determine whether it provided 
adequate protection to small business, the Blunt Committee, in its Report to 
the Government, made a similar statement: 
It is only purposive misuse of market power and not …efficiency inspired 
conduct that should be at risk. Accordingly, we recommend that the purpose 
element should remain because we consider it is fundamental to a provision 
dealing with misuse of market power.5 
The Blunt Committee concluded that Pt IV of the TPA should be directed at 
enhancing competition and should not be concerned with ‘unfair’ business 
conduct. 
The Courts, in construing and applying subs 46(1), have continued to stress 
that its policy objective is to protect the competitive process to enhance 
consumer welfare, not to protect individuals or small business competitors.6 
                                            
4 Aust, Senate, Debates, 14 August 1974, at  923. 
5 Trade Practices Consultative Committee, Small Business and the Trade Practices Act December 
,1979,  at [9.22]. 
6 In Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary  Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, Deane J 
stated: 
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As part of the amendments to the TPA in 1995, an objects provision was 
inserted into the Act. Section 2 states: 
The object of the Act is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition and fair trading and provision for consumer 
protection. 
Section 2 does not mention efficiency. Does this mean that Parliament 
preferred competition over efficiency, or that it assumed that efficiency was 
inherent in the word ‘competition’?  
What is embraced within the term ‘welfare’?  The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
(8th ed) defines ‘welfare’ in two different ways: first, to mean ‘well being, 
happiness; health and prosperity (of a person or a community etc); and 
secondly, to mean ‘the maintenance of persons in such a condition…financial 
support given for this purpose’. In the context of s 2 of the TPA, ‘welfare’ does 
not mean a government subsidy or payment. It may mean simply ‘well being’. 
The economic concept of ‘consumer welfare’ refers to the welfare of all 
entities that purchase and consume goods and services – government 
entities, large and small business operators, as well as natural persons. 
Under a consumer welfare standard conduct would be assessed according to 
whether it was likely to lead to lower prices, better quality or more variety 
available to buyers, and the efficient allocation of resources to satisfy the 
demands of buyers.7 
                                                                                                                             
The objective is the protection and advancement of a competitive environment and competitive 
conduct: Queensland Wire case (1989) 167 CLR 177 at 194. 
Mason CJ and Wilson J also confirmed that the objective of the section is to protect consumers not 
competitors: 
The object of s 46 is to protect the interests of consumers, the operation of the section being 
predicated on the assumption that competition is a means to that end: Queensland Wire case 
(1989) 167 CLR 177 at 191. 
In Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne 
and Callinan JJ stated: 
Section 46 aims to promote competition, not the private interests of particular persons or 
corporations: Melway case (2001) 205 CLR 1 at 13 [17]. 
In Boral Besser Masonry Limited  v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374, Gleeson CJ and Callinan J stated: 
The purpose of the Act is to promote competition, not to protect the private interests of particular 
persons or corporations. Competition damages competitors. If the damage is sufficiently serious, 
competition may eliminate a competitor: Boral case (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 411 [87]. 
In ACCC v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (2007) 237 ALR 512 at 535, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Crennan JJ stated that the object of the TPA was to promote competition in the public 
interest, not to protect governments carrying on a business and those dealing with governments in 
relation to those businesses. 
7 In Re Qantas Airways Limited (2005) ATPR 42-065 at [185] the Tribunal, adopted a total welfare 
standard in relation to the authorisation provisions of Pt VIII of the TPA subject to a caveat regarding the 
weight to be given to public benefits. The Tribunal concluded: 
In our view, the objective and statutory language of the Act, as well as precedent, support the use 
of a form of the total welfare standard as the most appropriate standard for identifying and 
assessing public benefit. We say a “form of” the total welfare standard because, … whilst the 
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A further source of confusion is whether the objective of ‘fair trading’ is 
intended to apply to the competition provisions in Pt IV, or only to Pt IVA 
(unconscionable conduct) and Pt V (consumer protection) of the Act. 
In 1997, the issue of whether s 46 should be amended to catch unfair trading 
was debated before the Reid Committee. Chapter 6 of the Reid Report8 is 
devoted to a consideration of the role played by s 46 and the inter-relationship 
between it and the unfair trading provisions of the TPA.  
The Reid Committee concluded that s 46 was not the appropriate mechanism 
for dealing with unfair trading. It stated: 
The Committee considers s 46 of the Trade Practices Act does not address 
many of the problems small businesses encounter in dealing with powerful 
suppliers and competitors. The Committee accepts it is not appropriate to 
attempt to protect small businesses through the competition provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act—which are designed to engender strong competition.9 
The Dawson Committee also concluded that no change should be made to s 
46 and that the policy objective of s 46 was the promotion of competition, 
‘even aggressive competition’ for the benefit of consumers, rather than small 
business protection. 10 
In 2004, the Senate Economics References Committee acknowledged that 
‘the wider purpose of the Act is clearly to protect competition and 
consumers.’11 However, after referring to the objects provision of the TPA, the 
Committee stated: 
the objects of the Act …also refer to ‘fair trading’ which suggests that traders, 
including small businesses, might expect protection under the Act from ‘unfair 
trading’. This, in turn, has led the Committee considering in this report the 
extent to which the Act, and in particular sections 46 and 51AC, contribute to 
‘fairness’ in the general, everyday and common-sense use of the term.12 
The Committee considered that ‘fairness’, or protecting small businesses from 
their larger rivals, should be one of the policy objectives of s 46(1). The 
Committee considered that ‘while the objects of the Act refer directly to 
                                                                                                                             
Tribunal does not require that efficiencies generated by a merger or set of arrangements 
necessarily be passed on to consumers, it may be that, in some circumstances, gains that flow 
through only to a limited number of members in the community will carry less weight. 
However, such a balancing exercise is not appropriate for the Courts in determining whether there has 
been a contravention of one of the substantive prohibitions of Pt IV of the TPA, which, prior to the 
enactment of s 46(1AA), was solely concerned with promoting consumer welfare. 
8Report by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 
Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia (May 1997) (Reid Report). 
9Reid Report, [4.67]. 
10 Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices Act, January 2003, p80. 
11 Senate Inquiry Report, p5 [1.19]. 
12 Senate Inquiry Report, p8 [1.21]. 
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enhancing competition, these objects implicitly require – or at least prefer – 
the existence of an effective number of competitors.’13 
The Committee summarised its views in the following passage: 
the purpose of the Act  is to protect competition. This can best be achieved by 
maintaining a range of competitors, who should rise and fall in accordance 
with the results of competitive rather than anticompetitive conduct. This 
means that the Act should protect businesses (large or small) against 
anticompetitive conduct, and it should not be amended to protect competitors 
against competitive conduct.14 
The policy objectives of s 46 are now buried in the semantics of the Senate 
Inquiry Report. As well as the long-standing consumer welfare objective, subs 
46(1AA) incorporates a new policy objective of small business protection. 
Such a policy will not maximise consumer welfare. Rather, it could detract 
from it by inhibiting healthy competition. Small business protection may 
eventually trump efficiency in s 46 cases. 
Thus, in construing subs 46(1AA) and the new subs 46(6A) it may be open to 
a court to have regard to the policy objective of ‘fairness’ in s 2 of the TPA in 
terms of equality of opportunity for all market participants and ‘small business 
protection’, rather than promoting strong competition and efficiency for the 
benefit of consumers.  
TAKING ADVANTAGE AND EFFICIENCY 
Unlike the other substantive prohibitions in Pt IV of the TPA, where the anti-
competitive conduct is defined in considerable detail, s 46 is drafted in broad 
terms and gives no guidance as to the categories of conduct that may be 
caught. Such a broad, open-ended legal standard leaves considerable scope 
for ‘evaluative and purposive judgments’ and taking into account any 
expressed policy objective.15  
The wording of s 46 has never addressed efficiency directly. Instead, the 
courts have factored efficiency into the ‘taking advantage’ element of s 46(1) 
applying the policy that underlies the law.  
Since the High Court’s decision in the Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v 
Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd, the ‘taking advantage’ element has been 
regarded as an objective test. The test is whether the conduct involves a use 
of the market power, in the sense of a causal link between the conduct at 
issue and the market power.16  A counter-factual is specified in which the 
                                            
13 Senate Inquiry Report, p5 [1.22]. 
14 Senate Inquiry Report, p6 [1.26]. 
15 Justice R S French, “Dolores Umbridge and policy as legal magic” (2008) 82 Australian Law Journal 
322 at 330. 
 
16 In Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary  Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, Deane J 
stated that the objective of s 46 is not concerned with moral issues such as equality and fairness , but 
economic issues: 
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respondent does not hold the same degree of market power and an 
assessment is made as to whether it would engage in the same conduct 
without that market power. 
If the conduct is consistent with the way a firm would be expected to behave 
under competitive conditions, then the requisite causal link is absent.17 
The critical feature of a misuse of market power is said to be this connection 
between the conduct and the respondent’s market power, in the sense that 
the defendant used its market power to bring about the conduct.  
Proof of the taking advantage element has required the input of expert 
economists, and in expressing their views they have generally considered 
whether the conduct is efficiency enhancing or not. Efficiencies can arise in a 
variety of ways not just from economies of scale or economies of scope, but 
also from vertical practices or vertical integration and reducing transaction 
costs.  
If the conduct at issue is efficiency enhancing, it does not involve a use of 
market power since this is the way one would expect firms to behave under 
competitive conditions. 
Frances Hanks and Philip Williams have argued that the decision of the High 
Court in Queensland Wire placed economic efficiency ‘at the heart’ of 
deciding whether conduct constitutes ‘a taking advantage of market power’ for 
the purposes of s 46.18  They point out that BHP’s refusal to supply the 
intermediate product, Y-bar to QWI was not justified in terms of efficiencies 
arising from vertical integration or economies of scope: 
In QWI there was no evidence of any economies of scope from having the 
manufacture of the Y-bar conducted by the same management as that which 
processed the Y-bar into star-picket fence posts. Indeed, all the Y-bar feed 
was produced in Newcastle. This feed was transported hundreds of miles to 
Kwinana in Western Australia and to Brisbane in Queensland – as well as to 
a separate processing plant in Newcastle – before conversion into star-picket 
fence posts.’19 
However, it would not have been a ‘taking advantage’ of market power for  a 
single-firm monopolist producer of glass bottles to refuse to supply molten 
                                                                                                                             
‘The essential notions with which s 46 is concerned and the objective which the section is designed to 
achieve are economic not moral ones. The notions are those of markets, market power, competitors in a 
market and competition. 
 
17 Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1 at 21 [44]. The High Court 
majority was concerned with economic efficiency rather than the protection of individual competitors. 
See [20] where it acknowledged that non-price vertical restraints on distributors may result in distribution 
efficiencies that increase inter-brand competition even though they decrease intra-brand competition. 
 
18 Hanks F and Williams P, “Implications of the Decision of the High Court in Queensland Wire” (1990) 
17 Melbourne University Law Review 437 at 446. See also Brunt M, Economic Essays on Australian 
and New Zealand Competition Law (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2003), 30–35, 334–336. 
19 Hanks F and Williams P, “Implications of the Decision of the High Court in Queensland Wire” (1990) 
17 Melbourne University Law Review 437 at 451. 
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glass to a potential competitor, because of ‘…the inefficiencies (that is, 
increases in costs) caused by breaking the process of production at the stage 
of the molten glass.’20 
Another example of this principle is provided by the High Court majority in the 
Melway case, in which Melway adopted a distribution system that gave rise to 
distribution efficiencies.  
The High Court majority cited21 with approval the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc,22 where the 
Supreme Court held that economic efficiency may enhance competition.  
In that case, the Supreme Court stated: 
Vertical restrictions promote inter-brand competition by allowing the 
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. 
Because of market imperfections such as the so-called ‘free-rider’ effect, 
services…might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, 
despite the fact that each retailer’s benefit would be greater if all provided the 
services than if none did.23 
This reasoning influenced the High Court in deciding that it was not a taking 
advantage of Melway’s market power to set up an exclusive wholesale 
distribution system that gave rise to distribution efficiencies. 
McHugh J, in Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v ACCC,24 drew attention to the role 
played by the ‘taking advantage’ element in protecting price reductions that 
derive from efficiency against allegations of predatory pricing.  
Section 46 would be a vehicle for anti-competitive conduct if the most efficient 
firm in the market had substantial market power and by reason of its efficiency 
could not take market share from its rivals without contravening the section. 
This makes little sense from the perspective of achieving an efficient economy 
with efficient resource allocation or for the benefit of consumers who can be 
provided with quality goods or services at lower prices. In a competitive market, 
the more efficient firms can produce more (because their average costs are 
lower) and obtain a greater share of the market with the result that they 
substantially damage their less efficient competitors. Such firms can expand 
their production until their marginal cost equals the market price. No one would 
suggest that an efficient firm with market power breaches the section because 
it increases its output to the level of its marginal cost. Yet the firm has market 
power, has substantially damaged its competitors and by intentionally 
increasing its output must have acted for a proscribed purpose. It does not 
breach s 46, however, because it has not “taken advantage of” its market 
power. 25 
                                            
20 Hanks F and Williams P, “Implications of the Decision of the High Court in Queensland Wire” (1990) 
17 Melbourne University Law Review 437 at 445. 
21 (2001) 205 CLR 1 at 14 [20]. 
22 433 US 36 (1977) at 55-56. 
23 Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc (1977) 433 US 36 at 54. 
24 (2003) 215 CLR 373. 
25 (2003) 215 CLR 373 at 464-465 [280]. 
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In RP Data Ltd v State of Queensland 26 Collier J had to decide whether the 
respondent had taken advantage of its substantial market power in the 
Wholesale Market for the supply of data relating to the names, addresses, 
real property descriptions, sales, valuation and ownership of real property 
interests in Queensland, by excluding the names and addresses from the bulk 
data supplied to RP Data Ltd and other licensees operating in the Retail 
Market.  
An expert economist, Dr Williams, in his report, stated that data on names and 
addresses are critical for a number of users in the Retail Market, and that if 
the Wholesale Market had been competitive, the respondent would have been 
unlikely to withdraw this data, because any refusal to supply by the 
respondent would have been met by a third party.27 Furthermore, the removal 
of the data could not be explained in terms of efficiencies forced by 
competition. 
In the light of this evidence, Collier J concluded that the respondent had taken 
advantage of its market power in the Wholesale Market in withdrawing the 
excluded data from supply to the applicant.28  However, the respondent did 
not have an anti-competitive purpose in doing so. The applicant and the 
respondent were not rivals in the Retail Market who were striving to outdo 
each other. Rather, the respondent’s purpose was to protect the privacy of the 
real property owners and prevent the misuse of the data for direct marketing 
by real estate agents.29 
2008 AMENDMENTS: PREDATORY PRICING 
Predatory pricing is now prohibited by two separate provisions, subs 46(1) 
and subs 46(1AA). The purpose of this part is to identify some of the 
uncertainties that surround the current tests and to compare the Australian 
position with the recently announced predatory pricing tests adopted by the 
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice30 and the EC 
Commission.31 
In the past, firms with substantial market power have been permitted to realise 
efficiencies not available to small business competitors and to under-cut them 
without contravening subs 46(1). Prior to the 2008 amendments the leading 
case on on what constituted predatory pricing for the purposes of subs 46(1) 
was Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC.32  
                                            
26 (2007) ATPR 42-197. 
27 (2007) ATPR 42-197 at [108] 48,272-3. 
28 (2007) ATPR 42-197 at [114], 48,274. 
29 (2007) ATPR 42-197 at [143], 48,279 and [174], 48,287 
30 U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-firm Conduct Under s 2 of the 
Sherman Act issued on 8 September 2008 available at the Department’s website at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681/pdf. 
31 Commission of the European Communities, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings issued on 3 
December 2008 available at the EC Commission’s website: 
http://ec.europa/eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance.pdf. 
32 (2003) 215 CLR 374. 
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Gleeson CJ and Callinan J, who formed part of the majority in the Boral case 
expressed a cautionary note about adopting cost-based tests in Australia: 
Section 46 does not refer specifically to predatory pricing, or recoupment, or 
selling below variable or avoidable cost. These are concepts that may, or may 
not, be useful tools of analysis in a particular case where pricing behaviour is 
alleged to contravene s 46. Care needs to be exercised in their importation 
from different legislative contexts.33 
Later in their judgment their Honours noted that if prices are fixed as a result 
of competitive market pressure, then a finding that prices are below variable 
costs is inconclusive: 
[T]here is nothing in s 46 that, as a matter of law, requires a distinction to be 
drawn between pricing below or above variable or avoidable costs. As has 
already been observed the distinction is unsatisfactory. Furthermore, in the 
present case it is of limited utility. For some, but not all, of the relevant period, 
prices charged by BBM were below BBM’s variable costs if no adjustment or 
allowance is made for the position of the wider Boral group. 
… 
To observe, as a matter of objective fact, that BBM’s prices were lower 
than BBM’s variable costs is inconclusive if the prices were fixed as a result of 
competitive market pressure. 34 
This latter point was also made by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ who 
formed part of the majority: 
[P]redatory price cutting is commonly distinguished from defensive price 
cutting, such as the cutting of prices in response to changed market 
circumstances including a drop in demand, which requires some new strategy 
if the firm in question is to survive …’ 35 
McHugh J observed: 
In my view, what is required is not a bright line rule about costs but a more 
sophisticated analysis of the firm, its conduct, the firm’s competitors, and the 
structure of the market not only at the time in which the firm has engaged in 
the conduct allegedly in breach of the Act but also before and after that 
conduct. 36 
There are both conceptual and practical difficulties with cost-based tests. 
Economists disagree about which costs are variable. Manufacturers and 
suppliers rarely have product costing systems in place that allow them to 
calculate the total cost or average variable cost of a particular product they 
produce. There are problems involved in the allocation of common costs. To 
                                            
33 Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 420 [124]. 
34 Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 421 [128]. 
35 Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 434 [171]. 
36 Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 462 [273]. 
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oblige firms to keep such records would impose a substantial cost burden on 
firms.37 
The High Court majority held that while the prospect of recoupment was not 
legally essential to prove a contravention of s 46, it might be of factual 
importance in determining whether the price cuts are the result of competitive 
market pressure (defensive price cuts) or a use of market power. However, 
the need to establish that the respondent expected to be able to recoup its 
losses in subsequent trading was left open. 
Gleeson CJ and Callinan J stated: 
While the possibility of recoupment is not legally essential to a finding of 
pricing behaviour in contravention of s 46, it may be of factual importance. 
The fact, as Heerey J found, that BBM had no expectation of being in a 
position to charge supra-competitive prices … was material to an evaluation 
of its conduct … the ACCC originally endeavoured to make out a case 
involving at least conscious parallelism between BBM and Pioneer. That 
attempt failed. If it had succeeded, the case may have taken on a different 
complexion. 38 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ agreed that a reasonable prospect of 
recoupment was not an essential element, but may be of some evidentiary 
value in determining whether a firm has market power. If the firm has 
prospects of recoupment this may indicate that there are barriers to new 
entry. 
According to their Honours, 
[I]t would, at least at an evidentiary level, be appropriate to consider what in 
the United States decisions is treated as “recoupment”.39 
McHugh J considered that the recoupment test had a significant role to play in 
distinguishing between competitive discounting and predatory pricing: 
Recoupment involves the capacity of a firm to price in a manner inconsistent 
with what a competitive market would dictate in order, at a minimum, to make 
good the losses sustained during the price war. Although a firm may seek not 
only to recoup its losses but also to earn monopoly profits, at a minimum a 
clearing of the losses would be required to make the conduct rational. The 
greater the degree of recoupment that a firm can achieve, the greater is its 
market power. But a firm that is unable to recoup any of its losses has no 
market power. 40 
                                            
37 In order to detect anti-competitive bundling telecommunications carriers are being forced to comply 
with new record keeping practices to ensure transparency. The information will enable the ACCC to 
calculate whether the retail price for a particular product is a true reflection of the cost of providing 
that product.  
38 Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 422 [130]-[131]. 
39 Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 440 [191]. 
40Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 468 [289]. 
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McHugh J explained the analytical advantage of treating recoupment as an 
element in determining a claim of ‘predatory pricing’: 
[Recoupment] provides a simple means of applying s 46 without affecting the 
object of protecting consumer interests. It enables a court to avoid getting into 
the messy area of cost analysis, examination of various accounting figures 
and competing expert evidence on the question of what are the relevant 
costs. A recoupment test requires the court to examine the market structure—
something the courts have had less difficulty with than with cost analysis—
and determine the ability of a firm to recoup its losses from its price-cutting. 
… 
It is only when the market structure is such that a firm could recoup, that 
courts will need to consider the relationship between price and cost.41 
Predatory pricing : subs 46(1) 
The 2008 amendments now expressly provide that in determining whether 
there has been a contravention of subs 46(1), selling at below relevant cost 
for a sustained period is relevant, but proof of recoupment is not necessary.  
The following matters will need to be considered in assessing whether below 
cost pricing contravenes subs46(1)  
 Substantial market power 
Did the respondent have substantial market power at the time of the intense 
price competition? The relevant factors for determining whether the 
respondent has substantial market power are the extent to which it is 
constrained by the conduct of actual or potential competitors, its customers or 
its suppliers.42 The respondent may have substantial market power even 
though it does not substantially control the market, or enjoy ‘absolute freedom 
from constraint’ from the conduct of actual or potential competitors, its 
customers or its suppliers.43 More than one corporation may have a 
substantial degree of power in a market.44 
Substantial market power is defined in terms of the ability to raise prices 
profitably above the competitive level without rivals taking away customers in 
due time.45 In Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC, Gleeson CJ and 
Callinan J stated: 
                                            
41 Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 469-70 [292]. 
42 Sub-s 46(3). See Boral Besser Masonry Limited v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at [121] (Gleeson CJ 
and Callinan J) and the commentary by Niblett A Gans J and King S, “Structural and Behavioural Market 
Power under the Trade Practices Act” (2004) 32 Australian Business Law Review 83 at 94-5. 
43 Sub-s 46(3C). 
44 Sub-s 46(3D). 
45 See Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited  (1989) 167 CLR 
177 at 188. 
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Pricing may not be the only aspect of market behaviour that manifests power.  
Other aspects may be the capacity to withhold supply, or to decide the terms 
and conditions, apart from price, upon which supply will take place.  But 
pricing is ordinarily the critical test.46 
Furthermore, Gleeson CJ and Callinan J stated that: 
Financial strength is not market power, although if a firm has market power, 
its financial resources might be part of the explanation of that power.  The 
financial ability to survive a price war is not market power, or a manifestation 
of characteristics that give market power, if, when the price war is over, the 
market is still highly competitive.  Power in a supplier ordinarily means the 
ability to put prices up, not down.47 
In Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC, the Full Court accepted48 the 
findings of Hill J that it was ‘commercially imperative’ for retailers to stock the 
Australian catalogue of each of the major distributors and that a refusal to 
supply would cause a retailer considerable inconvenience and loss of sales 
and profits. However, this was not enough to demonstrate substantial market 
power. The Full Court held: 
Market power is judged by reference to persistent rather than temporary 
conditions.49 
A similar view about the need to assess market power over the longer term 
was taken in Australian Gas Light Company v ACCC (No 3).50 AGL, a major 
retailer of electricity and gas in the national electricity market sought a 
declaration that its acquisition of a 35% interest in Loy Yang Power (LYP), a 
major generator of electricity in Victoria was not likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition. There was evidence that during the 
summer of 2000/2001, LYP embarked on a deliberate strategy of bidding its 
capacity in such a way as to increase spot prices.51 
Nevertheless, French J held that this was not evidence of market power: 
In my opinion the market tactics here being discussed assume the character 
of something that looks less like the exercise of market power than 
moderately well informed betting on the market. … no doubt, as Victoria’s 
largest generator, it is in a position opportunistically to respond to 
                                                                                                                             
 
46 (2003) 215 CLR 374 at [136]. See Austrac Operations Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (2003) 
ATPR 41-960 where Austrac alleged that the State of New South Wales and FreightCorp contravened 
subs 46(1) by engaging in predatory pricing. Emmet J concluded at [37] FreightCorp did not have a 
power to increase prices, or to impose terms, or to reduce supply within the meaning of s 46(1). 
47 (2003) 215 CLR 374 at [138]. 
 
48 (2003) 131 FCR 529 at 565 at [153]. 
 
49 (2003) 131 FCR 529 at 568 [158]. 
50 (2003) 137 FCR 317. 
51AGL case (2003) 137 FCR 317 at 443 [437]. 
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supply/demand imbalance in very short time intervals and if all the variables 
are in the right place, to affect both spot and forward contract prices. The 
question is whether the existence of such opportunities and the fact that it 
responds to them from time to time reflects the existence of market power. 
There is a distinction to be drawn between what was referred to as “transient 
market power” and “persistent but intermittent” market power.52 
French J concluded that the existence of substantial market power needs to 
be assessed over a period of years rather than months, and certainly not the 
half-hourly price spikes which the ACCC argued demonstrated the exercise of 
market power. Over the longer term (two years), French J found53 that barriers 
to entry into electricity generation were relatively low and that gas turbines are 
able to be commissioned in ‘under two years’. 
In summary, an assessment of the substantial market power standard 
requires an analysis of the structure of the market and, in particular barriers to 
entry, over the longer term. Even in a competitive market structure, a firm may 
enjoy temporary market power because of a lack of information about price 
variations between suppliers. In the longer-term however, such price 
variations will tend towards uniformity. A position of substantial market power 
requires the existence of long-run barriers to competition and the timeframe 
for such an assessment is likely to be years rather than months. 
 Selling at less than relevant cost for a sustained period 
Did the respondent supply goods or services ‘for a sustained period at a price 
that was less than the relevant cost to the corporation of supplying the goods 
or services’?54  No guidance is provided as to what is the ‘relevant cost’ of 
supplying the goods or services or what amounts to a ‘sustained period’. The 
2008 amendments do not specify which measure of cost is the ‘relevant’ cost. 
A number of different cost standards have been proposed in the economic 
literature, including 
 average total cost; 
 marginal cost; 
 average variable cost; 
 long-run average incremental cost; and  
 average avoidable cost. 
                                            
52 AGL case (2003) 137 FCR 317 at 447 [456]. 
53AGL case (2003) 137 FCR at 430 [391]. 
54 Sub-s 46(4A). 
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Avoidable cost was adopted as the relevant cost in the Boral case by the 
primary judge. Heerey J provided the following example to illustrate these 
different cost measures: 
The concept of avoidable cost may be illustrated by the following example. 
Assume that to make an article a firm has to pay $6 for raw materials and 
incurs fixed costs of $4. Thus a sale for any price above $10 will return a 
profit. If the firm sells for $8, it will sell below cost and accordingly make a 
loss. But it will recover its raw materials costs and make a contribution to its 
fixed costs. So the firm is better off making the article than not making it. But if 
the price received is less than $6 the firm is worse off. It would be better not 
to make the article. In this example $6 is the avoidable cost, the cost that will 
be avoided by not making the article. The term variable cost is often used as 
a synonym for avoidable cost, and was in the present case. In strict economic 
theory there are differences, but they are not material for present purposes.55  
In the High Court, Gleeson CJ and Callinan J observed that it may be an over-
simplification to conclude that BBM should not produce the article if it could 
not recover its avoidable cost: 
To conclude that, in the example just given, BBM would be better off not to 
make the article than to supply it at $6, may leave out of account many 
legitimate business considerations. First, as already noted, there were 
benefits to the wider Boral group, both tangible and intangible, from BBM 
continuing to supply CMP. Secondly, even limiting consideration to BBM, it 
could make business sense to bear short-term losses in the hope that market 
conditions would improve. Thirdly, the alternative considered in BBM's 
strategic planning, as will appear, was to withdraw from the market. The costs 
involved in that are not taken into account in the comparison urged by the 
ACCC. The appropriate method of paying regard to so-called sunk or historic 
costs of investment is a fourth matter which does not here, but may, at some 
future time, call for consideration.56 
According to the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice 
the emerging consensus is that average avoidable cost is the most 
appropriate cost measure to evaluate predation claims, ‘…because it focuses 
on the costs that were incurred when the predatory pricing was pursued.’57  
Average avoidable cost is the cost of making the predatory sales. The cost is 
not measured over the entire output but only the additional output used to 
make the predatory sales. This might include an element of fixed costs if, for 
example, the factory had to be expanded to produce the predatory increment 
when the new firm entered. The Antitrust Division defines average avoidable 
cost as consisting of: 
                                            
55 Adopted by the primary judge, Heerey J, ACCC v Boral Ltd (1999) 166 ALR 410 at 431 [104]. See 
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 406-408 [68]-[72] (Gleeson CJ and Callinan 
J). 
56 See Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v ACCC (2003) 215 CLR 374 at 407 [70] (Gleeson CJ and Callinan J). 
 
57 U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-firm Conduct Under s 2 of the 




 …all costs, including both variable costs and product-specific fixed costs,  
that could have been avoided by not engaging in the predatory strategy. 
Unlike long-run average incremental cost, average avoidable cost omits all 
fixed costs that were already sunk before the time of the predation; 
consequently, average avoidable cost will generally be lower than long-run 
average incremental cost.58 
According to the EC Commission: 
The cost benchmarks that the Commission is likely to use are average 
avoidable cost (AAC) and long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC). Failure 
to cover AAC indicates that the dominant undertaking is sacrificing profits in 
the short term and that an as efficient competitor cannot serve the targeted 
customers without incurring a loss. LRAIC is usually above AAC because 
contrary to the latter (which only includes fixed costs if incurred during the 
period under examination), it includes product specific fixed costs made 
before the period in which allegedly abusive conduct took place. Failure to 
cover LRAIC indicates that the dominant undertaking is not recovering all the 
(attributable) fixed costs of producing the good or service in question and that 
an as efficient competitor could be foreclosed from the market.59 
In practice, however, it may not be possible to isolate the additional output 
(predatory increment) or to identify the additional cost incurred in producing it. 
Accordingly, average variable cost is sometimes used as a surrogate for 
avoidable cost. Variable costs are costs which vary with changes in output (for 
example, materials, energy, labour, repair and maintenance). As long as a 
firm’s price exceeds its average variable cost, it should be presumed to be 
lawful. If a firm’s revenues are less than average variable costs, it should be 
presumed to be unlawful.  
 Taking advantage of market power 
Did the respondent ‘take advantage’ of its substantial market power? This 
requires a consideration of the counter-factual approach already discussed 
and would allow the court to take into account whether the respondent was 
merely passing on cost savings arising from efficiencies. 
 Recoupment not necessary 
The respondent may contravene subs 46(1) even if it ‘…cannot, and might not 
ever be able to, recoup losses incurred in supplying the goods or services.’60  
                                            
58 U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-firm Conduct Under s 2 of the 
Sherman Act issued on 8 September 2008 at 64. Available at the Department’s website at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681/pdf. 
59 Commission of the European Communities, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings issued on 3 
December 2008 at [25], 11. Available at the EC Commission’s website: 
http://ec.europa/eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance.pdf. 
60 Sub-s 46(1AAA). 
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It would seem that evidence that recoupment is probable or likely may assist 
in establishing a contravention of subs 46(1). 
 Prohibited purpose 
Did the respondent have a subjective purpose of eliminating or substantially 
damaging a competitor, preventing the entry of a person into a market or 
deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct? There 
may be a distinction between predatory price cuts and defensive price cuts. In 
the absence of direct evidence, the prohibited purpose may be inferred.61 
Predatory pricing : Subs46(1AA) 
The following matters will need to be considered in assessing whether below 
cost pricing contravenes subs 46(1AA):  
 Substantial market share 
Did the respondent have substantial market share at the time of the intense 
price competition? No guidance is provided as to what constitutes a 
‘substantial share of a market’. This is potentially a low threshold, when 
compared with the substantial market power threshold in subs 46(1). In 
determining what is a ‘substantial’ market share the only requirement is that 
the court may consider the number and size of the respondent’s competitors 
in the market.62  This suggests that it is necessary to consider not just the 
absolute size of the market share but the size relative to that of the next 
largest competitors. Thus, if the respondent has a market share of 20% this 
may be substantial if the next largest competitor has a market share of only 
2%, but a market share of 20% may not be substantial if another competitor 
has a market share of 80%. Alternatively, if there are five competitors in a 
market each with a market share of 20 % they may all be found to have 
substantial market shares.  
The requirement of a substantial market share is likely to be more easily 
satisfied than that of substantial market power. Market share is only one factor 
in considering whether a corporation has market power. The key question is 
the height of barriers to entry. An assessment of the substantial market power 
standard requires an analysis of the structure of the market and, in particular 
barriers to entry, over the longer term. A substantial market share analysis is 
assessed at a particular point in time, namely, when the conduct at issue 
occurred. 
 Selling at less than relevant cost for a sustained period 
                                            
61 Subs 46(7). 
62 Sub-s 46(1AB). 
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Did the respondent supply goods or services, or offer to supply goods or 
services for a sustained period at a price that is less than the relevant cost to 
the corporation of supplying such goods or services? The issues surrounding 
the appropriate measure of cost are the same as those already identified in 
relation to subs 46(1) above. 
There is no need to prove that the respondent was ‘taking advantage’ of its 
substantial market share.  
 Prohibited purpose 
Did the defendant have a subjective purpose of eliminating or substantially 
damaging a competitor, preventing the entry of a person into a market or 
deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct? 
Because there is no ‘taking advantage’ element in the new subs 46(1AA), 
much greater importance will be placed on the ‘purpose of the below-cost 
pricing. Sub-section 46 (7) does not include a reference to subs 46(1AA). It 
would seem that because of the increased importance to be placed on 
purpose in the new provision, that direct evidence of purpose is required and 
that the prohibited purpose cannot be inferred form the surrounding 
circumstances. 
Soon after subs 46(1AA) was enacted the Chairman of the ACCC sought to 
dispel any fear that subs 46 (1AA) would discourage price discounting by 
more efficient competitors: 
a more efficient business selling at a price that is above its cost, but below the 
cost of a competitor, is not a violation of the Act. Competitive markets are 
designed to encourage efficient firms to prosper and deliver benefits to 
consumers – not to inhibit their ability to do so. Competition encourages firms 
with higher cost structures to compete on non-price elements – to innovate or 
to offer niche products or to use different marketing or organisational 
approaches to deal with their cost disadvantage.63 
Evidence of business reasons for conduct is admissible as indicative of 
purpose. But how are the courts to weigh the legitimacy of business reasons 
where the legitimate business reason (realising efficiency) necessarily 
involves harm to a competitor? Competitors will inevitably be hurt by hard 
competition.  
As Mason CJ and Wilson J observed in Queensland Wire: 
Competition by its very nature is deliberate and ruthless. Competitors jockey 
for sales, the more effective competitors injuring the less effective by taking 
sales away. Competitors almost always try to “injure” each other in this way. 
                                            
63 Samuel G, “Promoting competition or protecting consumers – the role of competition policy and its 
implications for Australian businesses” John Curtin Institute of Public Policy Forum, Perth, 12 October 
2007, p 10 available on the ACCC’s website at: www.accc.gov.au 
 19
This competition… and these injuries are the inevitable consequence of the 
competition s 46 is designed to foster. 64 
It would seem that corporations with a substantial market share can meet 
genuine competitive offers and that they are not expected to stand aside and 
lose customers to their smaller rivals. However, meeting a competitor’s prices 
is unlikely to be accepted as a defence if it leads to pricing below average 
avoidable cost or average variable cost.65 
2008 AMENDMENTS: TAKING ADVANTAGE 
One of the purposes of the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2008 
is to clarify the meaning of ‘take advantage’ in s 46 which gives effect to a 
recommendation of the 2004 Senate Inquiry Report. The 2008 Act inserts 
after subs 46(6) a new subs (6A) which sets out a non-exhaustive list of 
matters that the court may have regard to in determining whether the 
respondent has ‘taken advantage ‘of its market power.  
It provides: 
In determining for the purposes of this section whether, by engaging in 
conduct, a corporation has taken advantage of its substantial degree of power 
in a market, the Court may have regard to any or all of the following: 
(a) whether the conduct was materially facilitated by the corporation’s 
substantial degree of power in the market; 
(b) whether the corporation engaged in the conduct in reliance on its 
substantial degree of power in the market; 
(c) whether it is likely that the corporation would have engaged  in the conduct 
if it did not have a substantial degree of power in the market; 
(d) whether the conduct is otherwise related to the corporation’s substantial 
degree of power in the market. 
This subsection does not limit the matters to which the Court may have 
regard. 
This amendment follows a recommendation of the Senate Economics 
References Committee that the TPA ‘be amended to include a declaratory 
provision outlining the elements of “taking advantage” for the purposes of s 
46(1).’66 The recommendation stated that the new provision should be based 
                                            
64 Queensland Wire (1989) 167 CLR 177, 191 
65 See the Report of U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-firm Conduct Under 
s 2 of the Sherman Act issued on 8 September 2008 at 69-71, available at the Department’s website at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681/pdf. The Department does not accept a defence of 
pricing below cost to meet competition. 
66 Senate Inquiry Report, p15. 
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on the wording put forward by the ACCC and set out at [2.28] of the Senate 
Committee Report.67 
It is unclear whether this clarification merely seeks to codify the existing case 
law as part of the section, or to extend it. While elements (a), (b) and (c) 
reflect the tests developed by the Courts to establish the necessary link 
between the conduct and the respondent’s market power, element (d) is new. 
Is the test for relatedness the same as (a), (b) and (c) or does it mean 
something else? If it means something else, then what degree of ‘relatedness’ 
is required?  
This problem has already been encountered in relation to s 51(3) of the TPA 
which creates a partial exemption for conditions in licences and assignments 
of intellectual property rights. Conditions in licences or assignments of 
intellectual property rights are exempt only to the extent to which they ‘relate 
to’ certain subject matter. 
The wording is unclear since it gives no indication as to the nature of the 
relationship which must exist before the exemption applies.68 
If the words ‘otherwise related to’ in (d) are considered in the statutory context 
of the other elements (a), (b) and c), a court may conclude that a direct and 
material link between the conduct and the respondent’s market power is 
required, rather than any link, however indirect or tenuous.  
However, if a judge interpreting subs 46(6A) were to have regard to the policy 
objectives of fairness and small business protection, then there may be a 
greater preparedness to expand the scope of s 46 and find that subs 46(1) 
has been contravened on the basis of a much weaker link between the 
conduct and the respondent’s market power.  
At hearings before the Senate Inquiry, the Law Council of Australia argued 
against the ACCC’s amendment claiming that it had the potential to ‘remove 
the filter in s 46 which requires a link between the conduct and the market 
power’.69 The Senate Committee considered that 
the ACCC’s proposals, despite the views expressed by the Law Council of 
Australia, would make clear and explicit the requirement that a link be 
established between proscribed conduct and the possession of substantial 
market power.70 
The proposed subs 46(6A) does not limit the matters that the court may have 
regard to, so that a court may have regard to whether the conduct can be 
explained in terms of securing efficiencies of scale or scope that are not 
available to smaller competitors.  
CONCLUSION 
                                            
67 Senate Inquiry Report, p14. 
68 See Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (198) 144 ALR 83 at 102-103 (Mason J).  
69 Senate Inquiry Report, p14 at [2.30]. 
70 Senate Inquiry Report, p15 at [2.31]. 
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The Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (Cth) made a number 
of significant changes to s 46 including those clarifying the meaning of key 
concepts such as ‘substantial market power’ and ‘taking advantage’, and the 
relevance of cost-based tests and recoupment for allegation of predatory 
pricing. But it is perhaps most famous for what it did not achieve, namely, 
putting an end to the uncertainty in the current drafting of the predatory pricing 
prohibition in subs 46(1AA), and aligning it with the long-standing prohibition 
in subs 46(1). 
In reluctantly accepting the Senate’s amendments to the Trade Practices 
Legislation Amendment Bill 2008 relating to subclause 46(1AA), the Assistant 
Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs, the Hon 
Chris Bowen MP stated that the government would continue to monitor its 
effectiveness and reserved the right to revisit the issue in the future if it had 
unintended consequences.71  
Prior to the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2007, the 
courts indentified the policy objective of subs 46(1) as the protection of the 
competitive process for the benefit of consumers, rather than the protection of 
small business. Safeguarding the competitive process ensures that sellers 
provide the goods and services that buyers want, at the lowest prices.  
The small business protection approach adopted in relation to subs46(1AA) – 
making it easier for small firms to challenge the market conduct of larger firms 
– weakens the incentive to compete on the basis of price or to realise 
efficiencies which could result in lower costs being passed on to consumers in 
the form of lower prices. The promotion of social and political objectives, such 
as small business protection should be the subject of a separate legislative 
regime such as Pt IVA of the TPA. 
                                            
71 Hansard (House of Representatives) 16 October 2008, p10. 
